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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the failure detection system of an electro-hydraulic actuator with dual modular 
redundancy based on a  concept.   is a combination of virtual twin that 
operates in parallel with the actuator and represents its ideal behaviour, and a digital twin that identifies 
possible failures using the sensor readings residuals. Simulation-based system reliability analysis helps 
to generate a dataset for training the digital twin using machine learning algorithms. A systematic 
failure detection approach based on decision trees and the process of analysing the quality of the result 
is described. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of reliability engineering is to 
provide the ability of the device to function 
within the specified period of time. The problem 
is that at the design phase it is very difficult to 
predict all the possible factors that could lead to 
failure, so unplanned failures are almost 
impossible to be completely eliminated from the 
device life cycle. 
The consequences of failures can be 
significantly reduced by, for example, developing 
fault-tolerant systems, providing predictive 
maintenance and system diagnostics design. This 
makes possible to correct the inaccuracy of 
design-stage reliability estimations by adjusting 
to the real operating conditions. But reliability 
engineers often face at this point a conflict of 
increasing device complexity to improve 
reliability (e.g. by redundancy), which in turn 
makes maintenance and diagnostics more 
difficult. 
However, digital transformation brings new 
opportunities in these challenges. As an example, 
model-based development is becoming more and 
more important. Device simulation models can be 
used both in designing and predicting the 
reliability of devices, as well as during operation 
of a real device [1]. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the 
workflow of a simulation-based system reliability 
improvement by providing an accurate failure 
detection system. We use machine learning
methods that allow us to move from virtual 
prototype simulation models, already widely 
used in product development by many 
manufacturers, to a system that accurately 
identifies failure at the earliest stages of its 
occurrence with minimal use of physical 
experiment. 
2. RELIABILITY OF AN 
ELECTROHYDRAULIC ACTUATOR 
The object of this study is an electrohydraulic 
aileron actuator with dual modular redundancy. 
The typical structure of such actuators used in 
civil aviation, as described in [2], is taken as an 
example. 
We assume that the optimal actuator structure 
was obtained at the previous development stage 
(for example, with the help of fault tree analysis) 
and thus it consists of two electro-hydraulic 
actuators with independent energy sources 
connected in parallel to the load (aileron). In 
normal mode, both actuators work in parallel, so 
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that failure of one of them does not lead to a loss 
of control and implements the fault-tolerant 
system concept. 
Figure 1: Electrohydraulic aileron actuator with dual 
modular redundancy 
As with any system with modular redundancy, it 
must be equipped with an automatic diagnostic 
and control system that automatically switches 
off the failed actuator. A specific problem for 
dual modular redundancy systems is the 
difficulty of detecting which of the two actuators 
failed. One failed actuator causes disturbances in 
the system, both at the mechanical system level 
and via the control system, which leads to 
abnormal behaviour of the other actuator (which 
can be monitored by sensors).  
The next challenge is to accurately localize the 
failure. Not all failures require the same response 
from the control system. For example, a leakage 
in an actuator requires its immediate shutdown to 
provide the availability of the remaining 
hydraulic system; while a pressure sensor failure 
allows the actuator to remain functional by 
switching the control mode. Thus, the failure 
detection system must be able to differentiate 
between such cases and prevent false actuator 
shutdowns. 
On the other hand, failure must be detected and 
localized at the earliest stage with minimum 
intensity. This would avoid the emergency 
consequences of gradual failures and eliminate 
them through predictive maintenance. 
These problems can be solved by a failure 
detection system based on a system simulation 
model in combination with machine learning. 
3. HYBRID TWIN  BASED FAILURE 
DETECTION SYSTEM 
The failure detection system is shown in Figure 
2. The electro-hydraulic actuator 2 (for 
simplicity, only one actuator is shown) receives 
from the flight control computer 1 an electrical 
signal proportional to which the aileron 4 must be 
turned. Various sensors (position, pressure, 
temperature) are also available in the actuator, 
which can be used for control and diagnostics, 
and whose data from both actuators is collected 
in the receiver 5. 
The same input signal is received by the 
actuator's virtual twin 3. The virtual twin is a real-
Figure 2: Hybrid Twin  based failure detection system 
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time (or semi-real-time) simulation model based 
on an ODE describing the nominal behaviour of 
the actuator. To perform the twin function, the 
model must receive data from the sensors on the 
current values of the boundary conditions (supply 
and drain pressure, fluid temperature at the inlet, 
etc.) as well as load values. The output variables 
of the virtual twin are the calculated sensor data, 
which essentially represent their required values. 
Deviation of the real sensor readings from the 
virtual sensors readings of the virtual twin
(assuming that the load sensors and boundary 
conditions are correct) will indicate that there are 
faults in the system. To extract more detailed 
information on failure, a digital twin 6 is required. 
The digital twin is a real-time capable decision 
algorithm whose input receives all sensor values 
and whose output provides information about a 
possible failure. To train a digital twin, we use 
thousands of variations of the virtual twin, 
containing models of different failures. The result 
of the digital twin prediction can be used to 
update the virtual twin by fitting parameters and 
to trigger a flight control computer for correction 
(e.g. to generate a control signal to shut down one 
of the actuators). 
This combination of physically-based models 
and data-science is called a "hybrid twin
represents the next generation of twins by ESI 
Group [3].  
3.1. Simulation model as a virtual twin 
The first step to the actuator's hybrid twin is to 
create its virtual twin. The virtual twin design 
starts at the product prototype stage, when 
simulation models are created to check the 
requirements. In the process of product design, 
models are corrected, modified, validated in 
laboratory conditions and by the certification 
stage, as a rule, there is a set of models with a 
given accuracy simulating the device behaviour. 
In the next step, based on this model set, a 
compromise simulation model should be created, 
that can be used for real-time (or semi-real-time) 
applications. For our research we developed a 
detailed simulation model of the electro-
hydraulic actuator in SimulationX, the general 
structure of which is shown in Figure 3. 
The virtual twin of each actuator is placed in a 
virtual environment, that is a model of the 
environment of the real device with the same 
behaviour. This means that the virtual twin must 
receive not only control signals, but also 
environment information, such as the supply and 
tank pressure and temperature at the input of the 
output hydraulic line of each actuator, inertial and 
aerodynamic load on aileron. 
These data can be obtained either simply from 
sensors (as in the case of fluid pressure and 
temperature that can be measured by the sensors) 
or a combination of sensor data and a simulation 
model (as in the case of aerodynamic aileron load 
Figure 3: Diagram view of the aileron control system model in SimulationX
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that can be simulated based on altimeter data, the 
spatial orientation of the aircraft and its air 
speed). For further steps, it is important to note 
that for reliable use of the virtual environment
data, all sensors and simulation models must be 
equipped with their own failure diagnostic 
system. Data on the state of the object can be 
obtained only based on the assumption that the 
virtual environment is working properly. 
Another important requirement for the virtual 
twin model is the degree of detail of its physical 
content. The model assumptions should not be 
limited to the calculation of system state variables 
in which sensors are installed but should also be 
able to simulate the behaviour in case of possible 
failures. Figure 4 shows the detailed structure of 
the model of the electrohydraulic actuator 
developed in SimulationX. 
Figure 4: Diagram view of the electro-hydraulic 
actuator model in SimulationX 
The following requirements should be considered 
in the hydraulic drive simulation model used as 
virtual twin: 
The model of the hydraulic control servo 
valve contains a spool model based on edge 
geometry. This is important for further 
modelling of the clogging of one of the 
control edges. 
All sensor models not only transmit state 
variables, but also consider the process of 
converting a physical value into an electrical 
or a dimensionless value. At conversion 
points, fault models will be built in later. 
The final stage of virtual twin design is the 
validation of the model with the real actuator. The 
result of the validation is a field of confidence 
intervals of the model depending on the input 
variables. These confidence intervals are a basis 
of the failure diagnostics system, as we will show 
later. 
3.2. Fault-augmented virtual twin 
A digital twin training requires a large amount of 
data where the sensor data are clearly related to 
the detected failures. Collecting enough data in 
real-world conditions seems to be a big challenge 
that is difficult to realize in practice because of 
the need to create crashable prototypes and a 
large number of experiments. However, the same 
simulation model that was used to create the 
virtual twin can be used to generate this data. For 
this purpose, the model has been augmented with 
fault models that can occur in real operation. 
Manual fault augmentation requires a deep 
understanding of the system and analysis of 
device operation history data. At the same time, a 
precise physical description of all possible 
failures is hardly possible due to their difficult 
predictability. Paper [4] describes a way to 
simplify and partially automate this process. The 
main idea is that faults are semi-automatically 
injected in the simulation model. The faults are 
similar for different physical domains (leakage, 
increased friction, signal noise, etc.), simulated as 
simple as possible, but can be parametrically 
changed with different intensity. This allows to 
generate a large dataset containing many 
theoretically possible failures without requiring 
manual modelling of each failure individually. 
The following types of failures were simulated 
in our study: 
Fluid internal and external leakage 
Valve edge clogging 
Servo valve actuator fault 
o Natural frequency reduction 
o Damping loss 
Signal faults 
o Bias 
o Calibration error 
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A detailed description of the simulation of 
these failures is given in [5]. 
We presume that failures should be detected at 
an early stage. As a result, we can assume that the 
occurrence of failure combinations is unlikely 
and thus significantly reduce the required number 
of models. Nevertheless, even in this case we are 
talking about hundreds and thousands of possible 
failures with different intensities. All failures 
should be classified into a limited number of 
categories to be used in a failure detection 
system. Table 1 shows the classification we 
propose. 
Table 1: Failure Categories 
Shut 
Down! 
External Leakage 4 40 
Control Valve 
Failure 
1 100 
Supply Valve 
Failure 
1 10 
Tank Valve 
Failure 
1 10 
Change 
Control 
Mode! 
Cylinder Pressure 
Sensor Failure 
2 80 
Displacement 
Sensor Failure 
1 40 
Warning!
Cylinder Internal 
Leakage 
1 10 
Valve 
Displacement 
Sensor Failure 
1 40 
Supply/Tank 
Pressure Sensor 
Failure 
2 80 
Sum (x2 Actuators): 28 820 
First of all, failures differ by the actuator in 
which they occur. After that, failures should be 
classified according to the required control 
system actions. Three categories have been 
defined: 
Shut Down! includes failures that require 
the immediate disconnection of the failed 
actuator from the hydraulic system and its 
switch to passive damping mode. 
refers to failures 
that require a change in the operating mode of 
the ECU.
Warning!  faults do not require an 
immediate response but must be fixed by 
technical staff during maintenance. 
To fix a failure during maintenance, it is 
necessary to accurately localize it by the 
component in which it occurred. However, within 
the same component, failures may have different 
nature. For example, category Control Valve 
includes both control edge clogging and 
actuator fault or accuracy loss. 
3.3. Failure detectability and sensor 
readings 
Any failures that occur in the actuator during the 
operation lead to deviations of variables, that 
defining the system state  at time  from the 
nominal behaviour , called errors .  
(1) 
A failure can be detected if one of the 
components of  at the time point  exceeds 
a certain threshold : 
(2) 
In the failure detection system, the 
unobservable nominal behavior is replaced by the 
behavior of a virtual twin  with output 
discrete virtual sensor variables 
. The state variables of the 
real actuator are estimated using the sensor 
readings . Thus, the theoretical 
error value  is replaced by the 
observable residual value : 
(3) 
It is necessary to note that in this case only 
those failures can be detected and classified 
which lead to errors of state variables 
measured by available sensors. The first problem 
is that the errors in sensors themselves lead to 
deviations of their readings .  
The next problem is that the results of the 
virtual twin are calculated virtual sensor readings 
, which we assume to be distributed around 
the real .  
This leads to a distribution of the residual 
value . Thus, not any deviation of from zero 
indicates an error but could be only a result of 
sensor error and/or virtual twin model error. A 
condition must be defined for when the value(s) 
of significantly deviate(s) from zero. This 
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condition and with it the accuracy of failure 
detection both depend on the accuracy of the 
sensors used, the accuracy of the virtual twin, as 
well as the size of the dataset sample. 
In this demonstrator is assumed, that failure is 
detectable if one of the residuals to be out of ±3% 
band for each scaled residual value : 
(4)
The random nature of the model inaccuracy 
requires statistical processing of the residuals. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show histograms of scaled 
sensor residual probability distribution for two 
types of failures (external leakage and pressure 
sensor bias). The histograms were recorded with 
sampling rate 100 Hz during 90 s of simulation of 
the actuator's operation. 
Figure 5: Residuals relative frequency distribution. 
External leakage in the hydraulic cylinder. 
Figure 6: Residuals relative frequency distribution. 
Cylinder pressure sensor bias. 
A residual in one part of the system leads to the 
spread of residuals into other parts of the system, 
including the faultless actuator. This is also 
observed in the residual distribution: leakage in 
one of the cylinder chambers leads to an increase 
in the pressure residual of the other chamber, and 
a variation in the control valve behaviour. If the 
pressure sensor fails, this affects the pressure 
behaviour in the chambers of all actuators and the 
cylinder stroke sensor residual. 
To detect and localize failures, it is important 
to extract features from the residuals sample. 
Regardless of the type of residual distribution, the 
main features that can be used to identify faults 
are: 
Residual sample mean value: 
(5) 
Residual variance of sample mean: 
(6) 
In addition, a discrete indicator is required to 
show whether the residual is inside the 
confidence interval or not. 
The indicator is defined by the following 
equation: 
(7) 
Thus, each residual has three features that will 
be used to identify faults. 
3.4. Dataset generating 
Machine learning algorithms require a training 
dataset as input data. The dataset is based on 
simulation results and should be as close as 
possible to the conditions of the real device 
operation. Within the framework of this 
demonstrator it was generated three white noise-
based control signals with different amplitudes 
and spectrum and simulated each of them for two 
load levels (50% and 100%). 
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Figure 7:  White noise-based control signals for 
dataset generating 
Thus, the dataset will consist of six sets of 
possible failures (each of 820 variants), in total 
4920 variants. It would take a lot of work to 
create so many model modifications and collect 
results manually. To solve this problem more 
effectively, the System Reliability Analysis (SRA) 
AddIn of SimulationX was used.The SRA-AddIn 
has the following functions: automatically create 
a specified number of models with different 
failures and fault intensities, simulate all variants 
using all allocated processor cores and collect the 
results on the dataset [4]. 
After generation, the dataset must be prepared 
for machine learning algorithms. Namely, 
simulated failures must be classified and the 
variants whose residuals do not exceed the 
confidence interval have to be filtered out. The 
structure of the dataset is shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8:  Dataset structure after processing 
3.5. Machine learning based failure 
analysis 
Recently methods of machine learning in tasks 
for error detection and forecasting of failures in 
technical systems have become widespread [6, 
7]. Currently, a large number of machine learning 
algorithms are available for fault diagnosis and 
predictive maintenance [8, 9]. We analysed 
various available classifiers such as:  
Linear Support Vector  
Decision tree  
Multi-layer Perceptron  
Gaussian Naïve Bayes 
Random forest  
Linear Discriminant Analysis  
AdaBoost classifier  
Logistic Regression  
All classification methods have strengths and 
weaknesses depending on the available data size, 
needed accuracy and interpretability as well as 
selected features [10]. In the applied tasks for 
multiclass classification, it is recommended to 
compare the main metrics of the algorithms to 
each other and select the most exact and reliable 
one. According to the sufficient accuracy and 
interpretability the decision tree classifier using 
the CART algorithm with the Gini impurity 
metrics were chosen for the data set with faults 
[11]. The data set was investigated by the 
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decision three in the data analytics tool ESI 
Mineset. 
The objective of the classification algorithm in 
the context of failure detection is to find a rule 
based on the sensor residuals (column Residuals 
Features), which will uniformly group the 
failures of one type (column Fault Classifier in
Figure 8). Using the resulting rules for the real 
sensor residuals analysis, it is theoretically 
possible to obtain in real time a decision about the 
occurrence of a certain failure class in the system. 
In reality, if all available sensor residual 
features are used to identify detailed failure 
information, the following problems may occur: 
the algorithm will be very sensitive to 
changes in training data 
the resulting rules will be very complex and 
contain many conditions caused by the 
randomness contained in the dataset 
An illustration of the last point can be the 
result we have obtained with a direct approach to 
learning: some key decisions depend on a value 
lying within a range of tank pressure sensor 
residual which is less than 0,001% of the whole 
residual range. This effect is called overfitting
and such algorithms cannot be used in practice. 
To avoid these problems, we used a systematic 
failure detection approach. First, the detection of 
the failed actuator is trained on the complete 
dataset. Then, on a dataset containing only the 
failures of one actuator, the classifier of the 
control command is defined. Third, on the 
corresponding samples detailed failure detection 
is trained. This allows us to reduce the 
complexity of each classifier by limiting the 
height of the tree to 5-7 levels and avoid possible 
overfitting due to early stopping. 
As mentioned above, to identify the failed 
actuator, a decision tree algorithm is used. All 
residual features of all sensors are included in the 
training set, but the maximum height of the tree 
is limited to 7. The result is shown in Figure 9. 
The resulting tree uses mostly the discrete 
features rNoDev, and final splitting criteria do not 
have extremely small ranges. 1/3 of the dataset 
was used to estimate the accuracy of the 
algorithm. As result the model quality was 
91,49% (error rate 0,085 ± 0,005). The analysis 
of the most problematic terminal nodes (with the 
lowest purity value) shows that the most difficult 
case for the algorithm is to recognize and differ 
the failure of the cylinder piston stroke sensor of 
one actuator from another. This shows that 
possible actuator design changes (that would, for 
Figure 9: Structure of the decision tree that detects failure of one of the actuators. 
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example, identify a piston stroke sensor failure on 
a majority vote basis) would increase the 
accuracy of the failure detection system. 
Further, based on a data sample containing 
only Actuator 1 failures, the algorithm for 
recognition of failures classified by the command 
of the control system is similarly trained. The 
result obtained using the features of all the 
sensors (incl. Actuator 2) by very good model 
quality showed clear overfitting symptoms: many 
secondary features were involved in the decision 
process (such as drain pressure sensor variance), 
as was the focus on small changes in the cylinder 
piston stroke sensor readings. Using only 
Actuator 1 sensors for training improved the 
quality of the algorithm but did not solve the 
drain sensor problem. The best result was 
obtained after excluding the drain sensor 
readings: model quality  98,44% (error rate 
0,016 ± 0,006).
The training approach for detailed failure 
detection algorithms is similar to that described 
above, so this paper does not cover it. 
As a result of a systematic approach, a 
complex symmetrical structure of 9 decision trees 
is developed (see Figure 10), on the basis of 
which an algorithm for device diagnostics can be 
implemented into the flight control computer. 
Figure 10:  Macrostructure of failure classification 
algorithm 
4. CONCLUSION 
1. The implementation of the hybrid twin
approach shown in this paper allows to 
significantly increase the reliability of the 
electro-hydraulic actuator with dual modular 
redundancy through a failure detection 
system.  
2. Successful detection of the failure categories 
(with very small deviations from the nominal 
behaviour) depends on the accuracy of the 
virtual twin representing the real actuator. 
3. Generation of the failure detection algorithm 
for the digital twin requires the calculation of 
many fault augmented variations of the 
simulation model of the device, that can be 
significantly accelerated through parallel 
computing. 
4. The developed systematic failure detection 
approach using the decision tree algorithm is 
sensitive to the overfitting problem which can 
be resolved by training gradually from a more 
general category of failures to more detailed. 
NOMENCLATURE 
ODE Ordinary Differential Equations 
ECU Electronic Control Unit 
SRA System Reliability Analysis 
CART Classification and Regression Trees 
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